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🔒 Security & Privacy | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win
🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
Repository: osac-project/osac
Length of output: 224
🏁 Script executed:
Repository: osac-project/osac
Length of output: 246
🏁 Script executed:
Repository: osac-project/osac
Length of output: 1689
🌐 Web query:
GitHub Actions workflows top-level GITHUB_TOKEN permissions default write contents pull_request_target💡 Result:
In GitHub Actions, the GITHUB_TOKEN is a short-lived authentication token generated for each workflow job [1][2]. Its default permissions are governed by repository or organization settings [3][1]. Default Permissions By default, GitHub repositories may be configured to grant the GITHUB_TOKEN read and write access for all scopes, or a more restricted "read contents" default [3][1]. Because these defaults can be permissive, GitHub security documentation strongly recommends adopting the principle of least privilege by explicitly configuring permissions within the workflow file [4][5]. The pull_request_target Event The pull_request_target trigger is inherently different from the standard pull_request event [6][7]. While the standard pull_request event runs using the code from the pull request's merge commit and is restricted to a read-only GITHUB_TOKEN (without secret access) to prevent abuse [6][8], the pull_request_target event runs in the context of the base repository's default branch [6][7]. Because the pull_request_target event executes code trusted by the base repository, it is granted access to repository secrets and a GITHUB_TOKEN that defaults to read/write permissions [6][7]. If a workflow triggered by pull_request_target checks out code from an untrusted fork without careful handling, it creates a significant security risk by exposing these elevated privileges to potentially malicious code [6][7]. Best Practices for Hardening To secure your workflows, you should: 1. Explicitly set permissions: Use the permissions key at the workflow or job level to restrict the GITHUB_TOKEN to only the necessary scopes [1][4]. It is a recommended security practice to set the default to empty (permissions: {}) and then grant only required access [9]. 2. Limit GITHUB_TOKEN scope: Use the principle of least privilege to ensure the token has only the minimum access required to perform its task [4][5]. 3. Handle pull_request_target with caution: When using pull_request_target, ensure that any code checked out from a fork is handled safely and that secrets or high-privilege tokens are not inadvertently exposed [6][7].
Citations:
Set an explicit token policy for this workflow.
This
pull_request_targetworkflow only usesMERGE_QUEUE_TOKENin the step that runsgh pr merge; it does not needGITHUB_TOKENwrite access. Add a top-levelpermissions: {}block so repository or organization default permissions cannot grant unused write scopes.Proposed fix
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Source: Path instructions