diff --git a/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml b/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2fc7ac281
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+name: CIFuzz
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - '**.go'
+      - '.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml'
+  push:
+    branches: [main, master]
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+  security-events: write
+
+jobs:
+  fuzzing:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        sanitizer: [address]
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
+    - name: Build Fuzzers (${{ matrix.sanitizer }})
+      id: build
+      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/build_fuzzers@ba0e2e0399a10b7b42afb16e7a6c4ccd3ff52431
+      with:
+        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'hydra'
+        language: go
+        sanitizer: ${{ matrix.sanitizer }}
+    - name: Run Fuzzers (${{ matrix.sanitizer }})
+      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/run_fuzzers@ba0e2e0399a10b7b42afb16e7a6c4ccd3ff52431
+      with:
+        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'hydra'
+        language: go
+        fuzz-seconds: 300
+        sanitizer: ${{ matrix.sanitizer }}
+        output-sarif: true
+    - name: Upload Sarif
+      if: always() && steps.build.outcome == 'success'
+      uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@601d5b1bcb3e5ef5eea97a6d0dcdbbb8c2b80116
+      with:
+        sarif_file: cifuzz-sarif/results.sarif
+        category: fuzz-${{ matrix.sanitizer }}
diff --git a/fuzz_test.go b/fuzz_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..673e22b064
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fuzz_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+//go:build go1.18
+// +build go1.18
+
+// Copyright © 2026 Ory Corp
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+package hydra_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha512"
+	"hash"
+	"testing"
+
+	tokenhmac "github.com/ory/hydra/v2/fosite/token/hmac"
+	fositejwt "github.com/ory/hydra/v2/fosite/token/jwt"
+)
+
+// testConfig satisfies all HMAC strategy config interfaces.
+type testConfig struct {
+	secret []byte
+}
+
+func (c *testConfig) GetTokenEntropy(_ context.Context) int             { return 32 }
+func (c *testConfig) GetGlobalSecret(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) { return c.secret, nil }
+func (c *testConfig) GetRotatedGlobalSecrets(_ context.Context) ([][]byte, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
+func (c *testConfig) GetHMACHasher(_ context.Context) func() hash.Hash {
+	return sha512.New512_256
+}
+
+func mustMakeSecret(tb testing.TB) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+	secret := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(secret); err != nil {
+		tb.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return secret
+}
+
+// FuzzHMACTokenValidate tests HMAC token validation with arbitrary
+// attacker-controlled token strings. This is the pre-auth boundary
+// for every OAuth2 access token, refresh token, and authorization
+// code in Hydra. The token comes from the Authorization: Bearer header.
+func FuzzHMACTokenValidate(f *testing.F) {
+	secret := mustMakeSecret(f)
+	cfg := &testConfig{secret: secret}
+	strategy := &tokenhmac.HMACStrategy{Config: cfg}
+
+	// Generate a valid token for the seed corpus
+	validToken, _, err := strategy.Generate(context.Background())
+	if err == nil {
+		f.Add(validToken)
+	}
+
+	f.Add("")                          // empty
+	f.Add(".")                         // just separator
+	f.Add("abc.def")                   // invalid base64
+	f.Add("AAAA.AAAA")                 // valid base64, wrong signature
+	f.Add("not-a-token")               // no separator
+	f.Add(string(make([]byte, 10000))) // large input
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token string) {
+		if len(token) > 1<<16 {
+			return
+		}
+		// Validate should never panic, only return errors
+		_ = strategy.Validate(context.Background(), token)
+	})
+}
+
+// FuzzHMACTokenSignature tests the Signature extraction method
+// with arbitrary token strings. Signature is used to look up
+// tokens in storage — a crash here is a DoS vector.
+func FuzzHMACTokenSignature(f *testing.F) {
+	secret := mustMakeSecret(f)
+	cfg := &testConfig{secret: secret}
+	strategy := &tokenhmac.HMACStrategy{Config: cfg}
+
+	// Create a real token for valid case
+	validToken, _, err := strategy.Generate(context.Background())
+	if err == nil {
+		f.Add(validToken, validToken)
+	}
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token, compare string) {
+		_ = strategy.Signature(token)
+	})
+}
+
+// FuzzHMACGenerateForString tests HMAC generation for arbitrary
+// string inputs. Used to hash client secrets and other sensitive
+// strings — a crash here can break secret hashing.
+func FuzzHMACGenerateForString(f *testing.F) {
+	secret := mustMakeSecret(f)
+	cfg := &testConfig{secret: secret}
+	strategy := &tokenhmac.HMACStrategy{Config: cfg}
+
+	f.Add("test-string")
+	f.Add("")
+	f.Add(string(make([]byte, 10000)))
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, text string) {
+		_, _ = strategy.GenerateHMACForString(context.Background(), text)
+	})
+}
+
+// FuzzJWTValidate tests JWT token validation with arbitrary
+// attacker-controlled JWT strings. This is the pre-auth boundary
+// for JWT access tokens and OpenID Connect ID tokens.
+func FuzzJWTValidate(f *testing.F) {
+	// Generate a test RSA key
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		f.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	signer := &fositejwt.DefaultSigner{
+		GetPrivateKey: func(_ context.Context) (interface{}, error) {
+			return key, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	// Generate valid token as seed
+	claims := fositejwt.MapClaims{
+		"sub": "test-user",
+		"iss": "https://hydra.example.com",
+	}
+	validToken, _, err := signer.Generate(context.Background(), claims, &fositejwt.Headers{})
+	if err == nil {
+		f.Add(validToken)
+	}
+
+	f.Add("")               // empty
+	f.Add("eyJ...")         // garbage
+	f.Add("a.b.c")          // 3-part but invalid
+	f.Add("header.payload") // 2-part
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token string) {
+		if len(token) > 1<<16 {
+			return
+		}
+		// Validate should never panic
+		_, _ = signer.Validate(context.Background(), token)
+	})
+}
+
+// FuzzJWTDecode tests JWT token decoding with arbitrary token strings.
+// Decode is used even before Validate in many code paths.
+func FuzzJWTDecode(f *testing.F) {
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		f.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	signer := &fositejwt.DefaultSigner{
+		GetPrivateKey: func(_ context.Context) (interface{}, error) {
+			return key, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	claims := fositejwt.MapClaims{"sub": "test"}
+	validToken, _, err := signer.Generate(context.Background(), claims, &fositejwt.Headers{})
+	if err == nil {
+		f.Add(validToken)
+	}
+
+	f.Add("")
+	f.Add("...")
+	f.Add(string(make([]byte, 100000)))
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token string) {
+		if len(token) > 1<<16 {
+			return
+		}
+		// Decode should never panic
+		_, _ = signer.Decode(context.Background(), token)
+	})
+}
+
+// FuzzJWTGetSignature tests JWT signature extraction with arbitrary
+// token strings. The signature is used to identify tokens for revocation.
+func FuzzJWTGetSignature(f *testing.F) {
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		f.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	signer := &fositejwt.DefaultSigner{
+		GetPrivateKey: func(_ context.Context) (interface{}, error) {
+			return key, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	validToken, _, err := signer.Generate(
+		context.Background(),
+		fositejwt.MapClaims{"sub": "test"},
+		&fositejwt.Headers{},
+	)
+	if err == nil {
+		f.Add(validToken)
+	}
+
+	f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, token string) {
+		if len(token) > 1<<16 {
+			return
+		}
+		_, _ = signer.GetSignature(context.Background(), token)
+	})
+}
+
+// Ensure deterministic per-fuzz, not per-package
+var _ = tokenhmac.RandomBytes