diff --git a/internal/pathrs/mkdirall.go b/internal/pathrs/mkdirall.go
index 3a896f48415..81c9a022c74 100644
--- a/internal/pathrs/mkdirall.go
+++ b/internal/pathrs/mkdirall.go
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ import (
 // Callers need to be very careful operating on the trailing path, as trivial
 // mistakes like following symlinks can cause security bugs. Most people
 // should probably just use [MkdirAllInRoot] or [CreateInRoot].
-func MkdirAllParentInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, string, error) {
+func MkdirAllParentInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, string, error) {
 	// MkdirAllInRoot also does hallucinateUnsafePath, but we need to do it
 	// here first because when we split unsafePath into (dir, file) components
 	// we want to be doing so with the hallucinated path (so that trailing
 	// dangling symlinks are treated correctly).
-	unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root, unsafePath)
+	unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root.Name(), unsafePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("failed to construct hallucinated target path: %w", err)
 	}
diff --git a/internal/pathrs/mkdirall_pathrslite.go b/internal/pathrs/mkdirall_pathrslite.go
index c2578e051fe..0a6f25ebdc2 100644
--- a/internal/pathrs/mkdirall_pathrslite.go
+++ b/internal/pathrs/mkdirall_pathrslite.go
@@ -24,12 +24,11 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin/pathrs-lite"
 	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 
 // MkdirAllInRoot attempts to make
 //
-//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+//	path, _ := securejoin.SecureJoin(root.Name(), unsafePath)
 //	os.MkdirAll(path, mode)
 //	os.Open(path)
 //
@@ -48,8 +47,8 @@ import (
 // handling if unsafePath has already been scoped within the rootfs (this is
 // needed for a lot of runc callers and fixing this would require reworking a
 // lot of path logic).
-func MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error) {
-	unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root, unsafePath)
+func MkdirAllInRoot(root *os.File, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error) {
+	unsafePath, err := hallucinateUnsafePath(root.Name(), unsafePath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to construct hallucinated target path: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -67,13 +66,7 @@ func MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath string, mode os.FileMode) (*os.File, error)
 		mode &= 0o1777
 	}
 
-	rootDir, err := os.OpenFile(root, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open root handle: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer rootDir.Close()
-
 	return retryEAGAIN(func() (*os.File, error) {
-		return pathrs.MkdirAllHandle(rootDir, unsafePath, mode)
+		return pathrs.MkdirAllHandle(root, unsafePath, mode)
 	})
 }
diff --git a/internal/pathrs/root_pathrslite.go b/internal/pathrs/root_pathrslite.go
index 51db77440d7..0ddabf80429 100644
--- a/internal/pathrs/root_pathrslite.go
+++ b/internal/pathrs/root_pathrslite.go
@@ -28,11 +28,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 // OpenInRoot opens the given path inside the root with the provided flags. It
-// is effectively shorthand for [securejoin.OpenInRoot] followed by
+// is effectively shorthand for [securejoin.OpenatInRoot] followed by
 // [securejoin.Reopen].
-func OpenInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
+func OpenInRoot(root *os.File, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
 	handle, err := retryEAGAIN(func() (*os.File, error) {
-		return pathrs.OpenInRoot(root, subpath)
+		return pathrs.OpenatInRoot(root, subpath)
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func OpenInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int) (*os.File, error) {
 // open(O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW) semantics. If you want the creation to use O_EXCL,
 // include it in the passed flags. The fileMode argument uses unix.* mode bits,
 // *not* os.FileMode.
-func CreateInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
+func CreateInRoot(root *os.File, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, error) {
 	dirFd, filename, err := MkdirAllParentInRoot(root, subpath, 0o755)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -63,5 +63,5 @@ func CreateInRoot(root, subpath string, flags int, fileMode uint32) (*os.File, e
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), root+"/"+subpath), nil
+	return os.NewFile(uintptr(fd), root.Name()+"/"+subpath), nil
 }
diff --git a/libcontainer/criu_linux.go b/libcontainer/criu_linux.go
index 322e439578b..736743833c9 100644
--- a/libcontainer/criu_linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/criu_linux.go
@@ -540,10 +540,16 @@ func isOnTmpfs(path string, mounts []*configs.Mount) bool {
 // This function also creates missing mountpoints as long as they
 // are not on top of a tmpfs, as CRIU will restore tmpfs content anyway.
 func (c *Container) prepareCriuRestoreMounts(mounts []*configs.Mount) error {
+	rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(c.config.Rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rootFd.Close()
+
 	umounts := []string{}
 	defer func() {
 		for _, u := range umounts {
-			mntFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(c.config.Rootfs, u, unix.O_PATH)
+			mntFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootFd, u, unix.O_PATH)
 			if err != nil {
 				logrus.Warnf("Error during cleanup unmounting %s: open handle: %v", u, err)
 				continue
@@ -577,7 +583,7 @@ func (c *Container) prepareCriuRestoreMounts(mounts []*configs.Mount) error {
 			continue
 		}
 		me := mountEntry{Mount: m}
-		if err := me.createOpenMountpoint(c.config.Rootfs); err != nil {
+		if err := me.createOpenMountpoint(rootFd); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("create criu restore mountpoint for %s mount: %w", me.Destination, err)
 		}
 		if me.dstFile != nil {
diff --git a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
index 7aaa70d109f..4eb1cedafac 100644
--- a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ const defaultMountFlags = unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
 
 // mountConfig contains mount data not specific to a mount point.
 type mountConfig struct {
-	root            string
+	root            *os.File
 	label           string
 	cgroup2Path     string
 	rootlessCgroups bool
@@ -160,8 +160,17 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
 		return fmt.Errorf("error preparing rootfs: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// Pre-open rootfs. NOTE that if we need to re-enable support for mounting
+	// on top of container root (see issue 5070), we will need to reopen rootFd
+	// after such mounts.
+	rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(config.Rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rootFd.Close()
+
 	mountConfig := &mountConfig{
-		root:            config.Rootfs,
+		root:            rootFd,
 		label:           config.MountLabel,
 		cgroup2Path:     iConfig.Cgroup2Path,
 		rootlessCgroups: config.RootlessCgroups,
@@ -175,7 +184,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
 
 	setupDev := needsSetupDev(config)
 	if setupDev {
-		if err := createDevices(config); err != nil {
+		if err := createDevices(config, rootFd); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("error creating device nodes: %w", err)
 		}
 		if err := setupPtmx(config); err != nil {
@@ -203,7 +212,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
 	// container. It's just cleaner to do this here (at the expense of the
 	// operation not being perfectly split).
 
-	if err := unix.Chdir(config.Rootfs); err != nil {
+	if err := unix.Fchdir(int(rootFd.Fd())); err != nil {
 		return &os.PathError{Op: "chdir", Path: config.Rootfs, Err: err}
 	}
 
@@ -218,13 +227,14 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe *syncSocket, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
 	if config.NoPivotRoot {
 		err = msMoveRoot(config.Rootfs)
 	} else if config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWNS) {
-		err = pivotRoot(config.Rootfs)
+		err = pivotRoot(rootFd)
 	} else {
 		err = chroot()
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("error jailing process inside rootfs: %w", err)
 	}
+	rootFd.Close()
 
 	// Apply root mount propagation flags.
 	// This must be done after pivot_root/chroot because the mount propagation flag is applied
@@ -336,10 +346,8 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m mountEntry, c *mountConfig) error {
 			// We just created the tmpfs, and so we can just use filepath.Join
 			// here (not to mention we want to make sure we create the path
 			// inside the tmpfs, so we don't want to resolve symlinks).
-			// TODO: Why not just use b.Destination (c.root is the root here)?
-			subsystemPath := filepath.Join(c.root, b.Destination)
 			subsystemName := filepath.Base(b.Destination)
-			subsystemDir, err := pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(c.root, subsystemPath, 0o755)
+			subsystemDir, err := pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(c.root, b.Destination, 0o755)
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
@@ -372,7 +380,7 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m mountEntry, c *mountConfig) error {
 			// symlink(2) is very dumb, it will just shove the path into
 			// the link and doesn't do any checks or relative path
 			// conversion. Also, don't error out if the cgroup already exists.
-			if err := os.Symlink(mc, filepath.Join(c.root, m.Destination, ss)); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
+			if err := os.Symlink(mc, filepath.Join(c.root.Name(), m.Destination, ss)); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
 				return err
 			}
 		}
@@ -411,7 +419,7 @@ func mountCgroupV2(m mountEntry, c *mountConfig) error {
 		// Mask `/sys/fs/cgroup` to ensure it is read-only, even when `/sys` is mounted
 		// with `rbind,ro` (`runc spec --rootless` produces `rbind,ro` for `/sys`).
 		err = utils.WithProcfdFile(m.dstFile, func(procfd string) error {
-			return maskPaths([]string{procfd}, c.label)
+			return maskDir(procfd, c.label)
 		})
 	}
 	return err
@@ -436,15 +444,22 @@ func doTmpfsCopyUp(m mountEntry, mountLabel string) (Err error) {
 	}
 	defer tmpDirFile.Close()
 
+	hostRootFd, err := os.OpenFile("/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: open host root: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer hostRootFd.Close()
+
 	// Configure the *host* tmpdir as if it's the container mount. We change
 	// m.dstFile since we are going to mount *on the host*.
 	hostMount := mountEntry{
 		Mount:   m.Mount,
 		dstFile: tmpDirFile,
 	}
-	if err := hostMount.mountPropagate("/", mountLabel); err != nil {
+	if err := hostMount.mountPropagate(hostRootFd, mountLabel); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+	hostRootFd.Close()
 	defer func() {
 		if Err != nil {
 			if err := unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
@@ -513,9 +528,10 @@ func statfsToMountFlags(st unix.Statfs_t) int {
 	return flags
 }
 
-func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
+func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(root *os.File) (Err error) {
+	rootfs := root.Name()
 	unsafePath := pathrs.LexicallyStripRoot(rootfs, m.Destination)
-	dstFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, unix.O_PATH)
+	dstFile, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(root, unsafePath, unix.O_PATH)
 	defer func() {
 		if dstFile != nil && Err != nil {
 			_ = dstFile.Close()
@@ -552,9 +568,9 @@ func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
 			dstIsFile = !fi.IsDir()
 		}
 		if dstIsFile {
-			dstFile, err = pathrs.CreateInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
+			dstFile, err = pathrs.CreateInRoot(root, unsafePath, unix.O_CREAT|unix.O_EXCL|unix.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o644)
 		} else {
-			dstFile, err = pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, 0o755)
+			dstFile, err = pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(root, unsafePath, 0o755)
 		}
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("make mountpoint %q: %w", m.Destination, err)
@@ -584,7 +600,6 @@ func (m *mountEntry) createOpenMountpoint(rootfs string) (Err error) {
 }
 
 func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
-	rootfs := c.root
 	defer func() {
 		if m.dstFile != nil {
 			_ = m.dstFile.Close()
@@ -601,6 +616,7 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
 		// has been a "fun" attack scenario in the past.
 		// TODO: This won't be necessary once we switch to libpathrs and we can
 		//       stop all of these symlink-exchange attacks.
+		rootfs := c.root.Name()
 		dest := filepath.Clean(m.Destination)
 		if !pathrs.IsLexicallyInRoot(rootfs, dest) {
 			// Do not use securejoin as it resolves symlinks.
@@ -616,7 +632,7 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
 		} else if !fi.IsDir() {
 			return fmt.Errorf("filesystem %q must be mounted on ordinary directory", m.Device)
 		}
-		dstFile, err := pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(rootfs, dest, 0o755)
+		dstFile, err := pathrs.MkdirAllInRoot(c.root, dest, 0o755)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -624,17 +640,17 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
 		// "proc" and "sys" mounts need special handling (without resolving the
 		// destination) to avoid attacks.
 		m.dstFile = dstFile
-		return m.mountPropagate(rootfs, "")
+		return m.mountPropagate(c.root, "")
 	}
 
 	mountLabel := c.label
-	if err := m.createOpenMountpoint(rootfs); err != nil {
+	if err := m.createOpenMountpoint(c.root); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create mountpoint for %s mount: %w", m.Destination, err)
 	}
 
 	switch m.Device {
 	case "mqueue":
-		if err := m.mountPropagate(rootfs, ""); err != nil {
+		if err := m.mountPropagate(c.root, ""); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		return utils.WithProcfdFile(m.dstFile, func(dstFd string) error {
@@ -645,12 +661,12 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
 		if m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP {
 			err = doTmpfsCopyUp(m, mountLabel)
 		} else {
-			err = m.mountPropagate(rootfs, mountLabel)
+			err = m.mountPropagate(c.root, mountLabel)
 		}
 		return err
 	case "bind":
 		// open_tree()-related shenanigans are all handled in mountViaFds.
-		if err := m.mountPropagate(rootfs, mountLabel); err != nil {
+		if err := m.mountPropagate(c.root, mountLabel); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 
@@ -772,7 +788,7 @@ func mountToRootfs(c *mountConfig, m mountEntry) error {
 		}
 		return mountCgroupV1(m, c)
 	default:
-		return m.mountPropagate(rootfs, mountLabel)
+		return m.mountPropagate(c.root, mountLabel)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -943,7 +959,7 @@ func reOpenDevNull() error {
 }
 
 // Create the device nodes in the container.
-func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
+func createDevices(config *configs.Config, rootFd *os.File) error {
 	useBindMount := userns.RunningInUserNS() || config.Namespaces.Contains(configs.NEWUSER)
 	for _, node := range config.Devices {
 
@@ -954,7 +970,7 @@ func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
 
 		// containers running in a user namespace are not allowed to mknod
 		// devices so we can just bind mount it from the host.
-		if err := createDeviceNode(config.Rootfs, node, useBindMount); err != nil {
+		if err := createDeviceNode(rootFd, node, useBindMount); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
@@ -974,12 +990,12 @@ func bindMountDeviceNode(destDir *os.File, destName string, node *devices.Device
 }
 
 // Creates the device node in the rootfs of the container.
-func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
+func createDeviceNode(rootFd *os.File, node *devices.Device, bind bool) error {
 	if node.Path == "" {
 		// The node only exists for cgroup reasons, ignore it here.
 		return nil
 	}
-	destDir, destName, err := pathrs.MkdirAllParentInRoot(rootfs, node.Path, 0o755)
+	destDir, destName, err := pathrs.MkdirAllParentInRoot(rootFd, node.Path, 0o755)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("mkdir parent of device inode %q: %w", node.Path, err)
 	}
@@ -1128,28 +1144,22 @@ func setupPtmx(config *configs.Config) error {
 
 // pivotRoot will call pivot_root such that rootfs becomes the new root
 // filesystem, and everything else is cleaned up.
-func pivotRoot(rootfs string) error {
+func pivotRoot(root *os.File) error {
 	// While the documentation may claim otherwise, pivot_root(".", ".") is
 	// actually valid. What this results in is / being the new root but
 	// /proc/self/cwd being the old root. Since we can play around with the cwd
 	// with pivot_root this allows us to pivot without creating directories in
 	// the rootfs. Shout-outs to the LXC developers for giving us this idea.
 
-	oldroot, err := linux.Open("/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_RDONLY, 0)
+	oldroot, err := linux.Open("/", unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_RDONLY|unix.O_PATH, 0)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	defer unix.Close(oldroot)
 
-	newroot, err := linux.Open(rootfs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_RDONLY, 0)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer unix.Close(newroot)
-
 	// Change to the new root so that the pivot_root actually acts on it.
-	if err := unix.Fchdir(newroot); err != nil {
-		return &os.PathError{Op: "fchdir", Path: "fd " + strconv.Itoa(newroot), Err: err}
+	if err := unix.Fchdir(int(root.Fd())); err != nil {
+		return &os.PathError{Op: "chdir", Path: root.Name(), Err: err}
 	}
 
 	if err := unix.PivotRoot(".", "."); err != nil {
@@ -1320,12 +1330,20 @@ func verifyDevNull(f *os.File) error {
 	})
 }
 
+// maskDir mounts a read-only tmpfs on top of the specified path.
+func maskDir(path, mountLabel string) error {
+	return mount("tmpfs", path, "tmpfs", unix.MS_RDONLY, label.FormatMountLabel("nr_blocks=1,nr_inodes=1", mountLabel))
+}
+
 // maskPaths masks the top of the specified paths inside a container to avoid
 // security issues from processes reading information from non-namespace aware
 // mounts ( proc/kcore ).
 // For files, maskPath bind mounts /dev/null over the top of the specified path.
 // For directories, maskPath mounts read-only tmpfs over the top of the specified path.
-func maskPaths(paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
+func maskPaths(rootFs string, paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
+	if len(paths) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
 	devNull, err := os.OpenFile("/dev/null", unix.O_PATH, 0)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("can't mask paths: %w", err)
@@ -1338,6 +1356,17 @@ func maskPaths(paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
 	procSelfFd, closer := utils.ProcThreadSelf("fd/")
 	defer closer()
 
+	var (
+		sharedMaskFile *os.File
+		sharedMaskSrc  *mountSource
+		bindFailed     bool
+	)
+	defer func() {
+		if sharedMaskFile != nil {
+			_ = sharedMaskFile.Close()
+		}
+	}()
+	maskedPaths := make(map[string]struct{})
 	for _, path := range paths {
 		// Open the target path; skip if it doesn't exist.
 		dstFh, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
@@ -1352,11 +1381,48 @@ func maskPaths(paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
 			dstFh.Close()
 			return fmt.Errorf("can't mask path %q: %w", path, err)
 		}
+		// skip duplicate masked paths.
+		cleanPath := pathrs.LexicallyCleanPath(path)
+		if _, ok := maskedPaths[cleanPath]; ok {
+			dstFh.Close()
+			continue
+		}
+		maskedPaths[cleanPath] = struct{}{}
+
 		var dstType string
 		if st.IsDir() {
 			// Destination is a directory: bind mount a ro tmpfs over it.
 			dstType = "dir"
-			err = mount("tmpfs", path, "tmpfs", unix.MS_RDONLY, label.FormatMountLabel("", mountLabel))
+			if !bindFailed && sharedMaskSrc != nil {
+				dstFd := filepath.Join(procSelfFd, strconv.Itoa(int(dstFh.Fd())))
+				err = mountViaFds("", sharedMaskSrc, path, dstFd, "", unix.MS_BIND, "")
+				if err != nil {
+					// A bind-mount inherits MNT_READONLY from the source vfsmount,
+					// but if it fails fall back to individual tmpfs mounts.
+					bindFailed = true
+					logrus.WithError(err).Warn("maskPaths: shared tmpfs bind-mount failed, falling back to per-directory tmpfs")
+				}
+			}
+			if bindFailed || sharedMaskSrc == nil {
+				err = maskDir(path, mountLabel)
+				if err == nil && !bindFailed && sharedMaskSrc == nil {
+					// Establish this mount as the reusable shared source. reopenAfterMount
+					// resolves the underlying inode via procfs and re-opens it through
+					// rootFd, so the resulting fd is anchored to the real path inside the
+					// container rootfs even if path was a /proc/self/fd/N alias.
+					rootFd, err := os.OpenFile(rootFs, unix.O_DIRECTORY|unix.O_CLOEXEC|unix.O_PATH, 0)
+					if err != nil {
+						return fmt.Errorf("open rootfs handle for masked paths: %w", err)
+					}
+					reopened, err := reopenAfterMount(rootFd, dstFh, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC)
+					rootFd.Close()
+					if err != nil {
+						return fmt.Errorf("can't reopen shared directory mask: %w", err)
+					}
+					sharedMaskFile = reopened
+					sharedMaskSrc = &mountSource{Type: mountSourcePlain, file: sharedMaskFile}
+				}
+			}
 		} else {
 			// Destination is a file: mount it to /dev/null.
 			dstType = "path"
@@ -1372,16 +1438,17 @@ func maskPaths(paths []string, mountLabel string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func reopenAfterMount(rootfs string, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
+func reopenAfterMount(rootFd, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err error) {
 	fullPath, err := procfs.ProcSelfFdReadlink(f)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get full path: %w", err)
 	}
+	rootfs := rootFd.Name()
 	if !pathrs.IsLexicallyInRoot(rootfs, fullPath) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("mountpoint %q is outside of rootfs %q", fullPath, rootfs)
 	}
 	unsafePath := pathrs.LexicallyStripRoot(rootfs, fullPath)
-	reopened, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootfs, unsafePath, flags)
+	reopened, err := pathrs.OpenInRoot(rootFd, unsafePath, flags)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("re-open mountpoint %q: %w", unsafePath, err)
 	}
@@ -1411,7 +1478,7 @@ func reopenAfterMount(rootfs string, f *os.File, flags int) (_ *os.File, Err err
 
 // Do the mount operation followed by additional mounts required to take care
 // of propagation flags. This will always be scoped inside the container rootfs.
-func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootfs, mountLabel string) error {
+func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootFd *os.File, mountLabel string) error {
 	var (
 		data  = label.FormatMountLabel(m.Data, mountLabel)
 		flags = m.Flags
@@ -1437,7 +1504,7 @@ func (m *mountEntry) mountPropagate(rootfs, mountLabel string) error {
 	//
 	// TODO: Use move_mount(2) on newer kernels so that this is no longer
 	// necessary on modern systems.
-	newDstFile, err := reopenAfterMount(rootfs, m.dstFile, unix.O_PATH)
+	newDstFile, err := reopenAfterMount(rootFd, m.dstFile, unix.O_PATH)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("reopen mountpoint after mount: %w", err)
 	}
diff --git a/libcontainer/standard_init_linux.go b/libcontainer/standard_init_linux.go
index 570472bd41f..933c1de3441 100644
--- a/libcontainer/standard_init_linux.go
+++ b/libcontainer/standard_init_linux.go
@@ -142,9 +142,10 @@ func (l *linuxStandardInit) Init() error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := maskPaths(l.config.Config.MaskPaths, l.config.Config.MountLabel); err != nil {
+	if err := maskPaths("/", l.config.Config.MaskPaths, l.config.Config.MountLabel); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
+
 	pdeath, err := system.GetParentDeathSignal()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("can't get pdeath signal: %w", err)
diff --git a/tests/integration/mask.bats b/tests/integration/mask.bats
index 5783332ea18..782edbb3033 100644
--- a/tests/integration/mask.bats
+++ b/tests/integration/mask.bats
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ function setup() {
 	setup_busybox
 
 	# Create fake rootfs.
-	mkdir rootfs/testdir
+	mkdir rootfs/testdir rootfs/testdir2 rootfs/testdir3
 	echo "Forbidden information!" >rootfs/testfile
 
 	# add extra masked paths
@@ -55,6 +55,20 @@ function teardown() {
 	[[ "${output}" == *"Operation not permitted"* ]]
 }
 
+@test "mask paths [duplicate paths]" {
+	update_config '(.. | select(.maskedPaths? != null)) .maskedPaths += ["/testdir", "/testfile"]'
+	runc run -d --console-socket "$CONSOLE_SOCKET" test_busybox
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+	runc exec test_busybox sh -c "mount | grep /testdir -c"
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+	[[ "${output}" == "1" ]]
+
+	runc exec test_busybox sh -c "mount | grep /testfile -c"
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+	[[ "${output}" == "1" ]]
+}
+
 @test "mask paths [prohibit symlink /proc]" {
 	ln -s /symlink rootfs/proc
 	runc run -d --console-socket "$CONSOLE_SOCKET" test_busybox
@@ -73,3 +87,33 @@ function teardown() {
 	# so we merely check that it fails, and do not check the exact error
 	# message like for /proc above.
 }
+
+@test "mask paths [directories share tmpfs]" {
+	update_config '(.. | select(.maskedPaths? != null)) .maskedPaths += ["/testdir2", "/testdir3"]'
+	runc run -d --console-socket "$CONSOLE_SOCKET" test_busybox
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2016
+	runc exec test_busybox sh -euc '
+		set -- $(stat -c %d /testdir /testdir2 /testdir3)
+		[ "$1" = "$2" ]
+		[ "$2" = "$3" ]
+	'
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+	runc exec test_busybox touch /testdir2/foo
+	[ "$status" -eq 1 ]
+	[[ "${output}" == *"Read-only file system"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "mask paths [directory with read-only rootfs]" {
+	update_config '(.. | select(.maskedPaths? != null)) .maskedPaths += ["/testdir2", "/testdir3"]'
+	update_config '.root.readonly = true'
+
+	runc run -d --console-socket "$CONSOLE_SOCKET" test_busybox
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+
+	runc exec test_busybox ls /testdir
+	[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+	[ -z "$output" ]
+}